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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between oil prices, tradi-
tional fundamentals and expectations. Informational frictions may force a wedge
between oil prices and supply and/or demand shocks, especially during periods of
elevated risk aversion and uncertainty. In such a context, expectations can be a
key driver of oil price movements and their impact can vary over time. Overall, we
find that both traditional oil fundamentals and forward-looking expectations mat-
ter for oil prices. Our findings show that the real price of oil responds differently
to expectations shocks of business leaders, consumers and aggregate markets. Our
TVP-VAR approach provides evidence that business leaders’ expectations play an
important role in terms of oil price fluctuations and the impact is stronger in periods
of elevated global oil demand. In terms of traditional oil market fundamentals, we
find that oil prices have been significantly affected by the recent US shale oil boom.
Moreover, global oil demand had a positive impact upon oil prices, especially from
the mid-2000’s. Several alternative model specifications prove the robustness of our
analysis.
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1 Introduction
Oil is a core source of energy for the global economy and essential for economic activity.
Changes in oil prices can be rapid, and large price swings severely impact commodity
importers, exporters and speculators. For example, higher oil prices may lead to lower
aggregate demand and production outputs, induce inflationary tendencies and higher
interest rates for importing countries; whereas a sustained decline in oil prices supports
the so-called “resource curse” hypothesis for commodity abundant emerging economies.1
Thus, a better understanding of the nature of oil prices and their determinants are crucial
for policymakers and the private sector, and may lead to better decision making in areas
such as macroeconomic policy, risk and portfolio management (Xu and Ouenniche, 2012).
The recent economic literature has contributed substantially to a better understanding
of the causes of oil price fluctuations since the 1970’s. Traditionally, oil price fluctuations
were thought to reflect unexpected changes in oil supply, such as production disruptions
due to conflicts and co-ordinated supply constraints in producing nations.2 Subsequent
research has argued that supply factors were only one among many explanations and
less important than previously believed.3 In an innovative paper, Kilian (2009) has
disentangled the effects of demand and supply side shocks underlying the evolution of
the real price of oil. He found that, since 1973, major changes in oil prices were primarily
driven by demand factors. These factors included shifts in global demand for industrial
commodities and unanticipated increases in precautionary demand for crude oil.
Supply and demand fundamentals are clearly important. However, recent papers
have considered whether market participants directly observe these fundamentals. In
particular, Sockin and Xiong (2015) highlighted that the presence of severe informational
frictions could lead to confusion among market participants about the strength of the
global economy and oil demand relative to supply. Therefore, it may be unrealistic to as-
1See among the others, Lu and Neftci (2008); Frankel (2014); Baumeister and Kilian (2016).
2See Hamilton (2003), and Jones et al. (2004).
3See the literature from Lippi and Nobili (2012), Baumeister and Peersman (2013a), Abhyankar et al.
(2013) and Kilian and Murphy (2014).
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sume that producers and consumers can directly and contemporaneously observe whether
oil prices are fully consistent with actual fundamentals. Without a contemporaneous link
between oil prices and fundamentals, the role of expectations becomes crucial. In this
regard, the findings by Singleton (2014) highlighted the importance of accounting for
agents’ expectations in explaining the commodity market boom-bust cycles.
Our paper extends the literature on identifying the determinants of oil prices by in-
corporating economic agents’ expectations on the state of the global economy. This issue
relates specifically to informational frictions but more generally to research in behavioural
finance and psychology, which argues that moods and emotions affect individuals’ be-
haviour and aggregate prices and quantities (see, for example, Akerlof and Shiller, 2009;
Gino et al., 2012; Garcia, 2013). However, this topic has not been extensively investigated
in relation to oil prices. In our paper, we account for a range of confidence and leading
indicators which provide a broader perspective of the overall economic outlook. Global
survey-based confidence indicators shall therefore be adopted in this study as a gauge the
state of the global economy in the presence of informational frictions.4
There are several important reasons why it is important to investigate the role of
expectations in the oil market. First, although supply and demand factors of the funda-
mental cause of oil price fluctuations, expectations may be the proximate cause of their
movements. Second, expectations account for informational frictions and departures from
the oil price suggested by fundamentals (Sockin and Xiong, 2015). Third, expectations
also account for the idea that oil prices exhibit forward looking behaviour, which can
augment measured demand especially at turning points in the economic cycle. Further-
more, expectations are frequently emphasized in economics research, for example, the
New-Keynesian Phillips curve literature considers the importance of fundamentals and
forward-looking behaviour in a goods price setting (Gali and Gertler, 1999; Byrne et al.,
2013). Finally, expectations encompass the idea that there has been increased financial-
ization of oil, since investors shall seek to maximise expected returns based upon asset
4See, for example, Carroll et al. (1994), Bram and Ludvigson (1998), Ludvigson (2004), Bachmann
and Sims (2012), Christiansen et al. (2014) and Caglayan and Xu (2016).
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prices (Cheng and Xiong, 2014).
Given these arguments, the central contribution of this paper is to investigate the im-
pact of expectations upon oil prices. More specifically, we use three different expectational
proxies for OECD countries: business confidence, consumer confidence and market lead-
ing indicators. These three measures capture the expectations on future global economic
outcomes from business leaders, consumers and aggregate markets, respectively. Even
though these expectations may be interrelated and contemporaneous, business leaders,
consumers and markets can act on a specific set of (imperfect) information that emanates
from the state of the economy, rational inattention or the agent’s own asymmetric goals
and strategies. Figure 1 illustrates that, while there are similarities between these sources
of expectations, they do evolve differently over time. Therefore, it is important to find out
how oil prices would respond to variations in different economic agents’ expectations on
the state of the economy and we do this in our empirical study analysing the relationship
between oil prices, fundamentals and expectations.
While the focus of this work is upon expectations and oil prices, a second contribution
of this paper is to note that there are reasons to believe the impact of determinants upon
oil prices may be time varying and we should adopt a methodology sufficiently flexible
to account for this. For example, China has significantly increased its market shares
of global commodities following its rapid development affecting world demand (Kilian,
2009; Frankel, 2014). Financial investors’ risk-bearing appetite and the risk premium
can vary over time (e.g., Acharya et al., 2013; Cheng and Xiong, 2014). There is also
time-dependent volatility in world oil production (e.g., Baumeister and Peersman, 2013a;
Baumeister and Peersman, 2013b). Importantly, informational frictions may themselves
change over time, also leading to a decoupling of oil prices and fundamentals in periods
of acute uncertainty about the global economy. These characteristics imply a time-
varying relationship between the underlying drivers and oil prices.5 Therefore, to carry
out our investigation, we use a time-varying vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) model
5See, for example, Peersman and Van Robays (2012), Millard and Shakir (2013) and Baumeister and
Peersman (2013a).
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with stochastic volatility model to simultaneously model the evolving roles of both oil
market fundamentals and expectation shocks on oil prices for the period between 1974
and 2016.
Our estimated results show that oil prices respond to both traditional fundamentals
and heterogeneous economic agents’ expectations over time. In particular, we find that
the real price of oil responds differently to expectations that arise from business leaders,
consumers and aggregate markets. In this regard, shocks to business leaders have the
most important role in explaining oil price movements and increases in business leaders’
expectations have a large and positive impact upon the real price of oil although this
effect is very time-dependent. Optimistic business leaders’ expectations coincide with
stronger oil demand and, in turn, induce a higher real oil price. Such a result is explained
by the fact that business leaders are generally well informed about prospects for the
economy. In contrast, our findings indicate that consumers’ confidence plays a negligible
role in terms of oil price fluctuations. In particular, our variance decomposition shows
that consumers’ expectations contribute less than 2% of oil price variation one year after
the shock occurs.
In terms of traditional oil market fundamentals, our estimated results show that the
recent US shale oil boom had a strong negative effect on the real oil price. Finally, we
find that, since the middle of the 2000’s, oil prices responded positively and strongly
to unexpected increases in demand, possibly due to increased demand for industrial
commodities from many emerging market economies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally presents our econo-
metric methodology and Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 reports the empirical
results and robustness checks. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
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2 Empirical Methodology
In this section, we present our empirical model that builds on the structural VAR analysis
of the real oil price proposed by Kilian (2009). As an extension of the framework provided
by Kilian (2009), we also include expectations of different economic agents as we discuss
below. Following Peersman and Van Robays (2009) and Peersman and Van Robays
(2012), we adopt the Bayesian technique for estimation and inference. As it is well
known, the Bayesian approach has two main advantages. Firstly, it is computationally
simple. Secondly, it provides a conceptually clean way of drawing error bands for impulse
responses from VAR models (Peersman and Van Robays, 2012). Finally, we account for
time-varying parameters (TVP) in order to examine the determinants of oil prices. The
TVP-VAR model with stochastic volatility allows us to understand how changes in oil
market fundamentals and economic expectations affect the real oil price over time.
Our basic VAR model can be written as follows:6
A0Yt = Σ
p
i=1ΓiYt−i + ut, t = p+ 1, ..., T (1)
where Yt is a K × 1 vector of endogenous variables including the changes in the global
oil production (∆prodt), an index of global real economic activity (reat), the changes
of economic agents’ expectations (∆expt), and the real price of oil (rpot). Γi denotes a
K×K matrix of coefficients, A0 indicates a K×K matrix of contemporaneous coefficients
of Yt, and ut denotes the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural shocks.
The lag length is set to two (i.e. p = 2).7
In order to orthogonalize the shocks, we impose a recursive structure on the contem-
poraneous terms and assume exclusion restrictions on A−10 . In particular, the structural
6In Appendix A, we provide the full derivation for both the constant parameter Bayesian VAR and
the time-varying parameter Bayesian VAR with stochastic volatility.
7Most lag length specification tests (e.g., Final Prediction Error; Akaike Information Criterion; and
Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion) suggest that two lags should be included for our model with
quarterly data.
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shocks ut are identified by decomposing the reduced-form errors εt as follows:
εt ≡

ε∆prodtt
εreatt
ε∆exptt
εrpott

=

1 0 0 0
a21 1 0 0
a31 a32 1 0
a41 a42 a43 1


usupplyt
udemandt
uexpt
urest

(2)
As we can observe from equation (2) we assume four structural shocks that drive the real
price of oil. Firstly, usupplyt reflects an unexpected shift of global oil supply. These are not
driven by changes in the macroeconomic environment, but due to exogenous production
disruptions due to political instabilities, wars or changes in production quotas set by the
OPEC members. Secondly, udemandt captures the shift in the demand for all industrial
commodities including crude oil that is associated with unexpected fluctuations in the
global business cycle, such as the unexpected strong demand from emerging economies.
Next, uexpt reflects the variations of specific economic agents’ (i.e., consumers, business
leaders, and markets) expectations about future economic conditions. These expecta-
tions proxy agents’ sentiment about future economic trends. Sentiment may vary based
upon elevated risk or uncertainty in financial markets, as in the global financial crisis.
Finally, urest denotes the residual shock that captures idiosyncratic oil demand shocks not
otherwise accounted for.8
As we explained above, we estimate the VAR model with Bayesian methods.9 In
particular, we adopt the independent Normal-Wishart prior, which is more flexible than
the natural conjugate prior. Following Primiceri (2005), we use a training sample prior
that corresponds to the first 40 observations (1974:Q4 to 1984:Q3). Using the Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method, 100,000 samples are obtained after the initial
30,000 samples are used as burn-in and discarded.
8In Appendix A, we describe in detail the restrictions on A−10 that are based on economic intuitions.
9All estimations are implemented with Matlab R2014B (https://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab.html).
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3 Data
To carry out our investigation we use quarterly data and our sample period begins in
1974:Q4 and ends in 2016:Q1. In Table 1, we present the sources and definitions of the
data used in this study. First of all, we use the percentage change of oil production
(∆prodt) obtained by the log differences of world crude oil production in millions per
barrels pumped per day (averaged by quarter). This data is obtained from the Energy
Information Administration (EIA). Secondly, as a proxy for global economic activity
(reat) and following Kilian (2009) we use a measure constructed from an equal-weighted
index of the percent growth rates of a panel of single voyage bulk dry cargo ocean shipping
freight rates measured in dollars per metric ton.10 The rationale behind using this proxy
is that increases in shipping rates reflects changes in the global demand for industrial
commodities, including that of emerging countries such as China and India, given that
supply of ocean-going vessels is likely to be inelastic in the short-run.
Regarding our measures of economic agents’ expectations (∆expt), we extract stan-
dardized and amplitude adjusted business confidence indicators, consumer confidence
indicators, and composite leading indicators for all OECD countries from the “OECD
Main Economic Indicators” database. The main advantage of utilising composite indi-
cators from the OECD is that they apply the same criteria to construct their indicators
across countries, so that they are consistent and comparable. Firstly, we use the OECD’s
Business Confidence Index (BCI) as a proxy for business leaders’ expectations. This
indicator combines a set of business tendency survey variables (e.g., the current and im-
mediate future expectations on production, orders and stocks) into a single composite
indicator that summarizes managers’ assessment and expectation of the general economic
situation. To capture consumers’ expectations, we make use of the OECD’s Consumer
Confidence Index (CCI). CCI is based on information collected from consumer opinion
surveys regarding the households’ intensions for major purchases, their current economic
10Data used in Kilian (2009) is available from Lutz Kilian’s homepage. The reader is referred to Kilian
(2009) for details on the construction of this index.
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state as compared to the recent past and their expectations for the immediate future
(i.e., three months). The main characteristic of the business and consumer surveys is
that they ask for the direction of change by referencing to a normal state. In translating
these qualitative results into a time series, only the balance is shown by taking the dif-
ference between percentages of respondents giving favourable and unfavourable answers.
Both BCI and CCI are expressed as an index (normalised at 100) and they are seasonally
adjusted. In addition, we use the Composite Leading Indicator (CLI) to capture the ag-
gregate perception of the business leaders and consumers on the economic outlook. CLI
is an aggregate time series which comprises a set of component series selected from a wide
range of key short-term economic indicators. Although the underlying component series
can be different for different countries depending on their economic significance, cycli-
cal behaviour, data quality, timeliness and availability for the specific country, the CLI
is designed to capture turning points and moves in the same directions as the business
cycle.11
Our measure of the real oil price (rpot) is based on the Europe Brent spot price FOB
which is expressed in US dollars per barrel. We use this series as the relevant crude oil
price for the world economy.12 The monthly series of the Brent crude oil price obtained
from the Datastream database is aggregated in quarterly terms and deflated using the US
consumer price index. Figure 2 depicts the behaviour and dynamics of the price of Brent
crude for the sample period 1985-2016. The graph shows that the oil price can be sensitive
to different shocks including changes in global crude oil production, unexpected changes
in global macroeconomic conditions, unexpected strong demand for oil from emerging
markets and the global financial crisis (e.g., Abhyankar et al., 2013; Kilian, 2008; Kilian,
2016).
11For detailed component series for each country, the reader is referred to the OECD Leading Indicators
webpage.
12In the robustness checks section, we present the estimated results of our model using the US refiner
acquisition cost of imported crude oil; this does not qualitatively change our main conclusions.
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4 Empirical Discussion
In this section, we examine the relationships between oil price shocks, oil market funda-
mentals and economic agents’ expectations. Before presenting our estimated results, we
describe the intuition behind the link between oil price changes and agents’ expectations.
4.1 Economic Agents’ Expectations and Oil Price Fluctuations
The previous economic literature has shown that there are several channels through which
physical oil demand can be potentially affected. Kilian and Murphy (2014) found that
the speculative channel played an important role during the oil price shock episodes of
1979, 1986, and 1990. More recently, the study by Gao et al. (2017) highlighted the
role of precautionary inventory stocks. In our paper we focus on an alternative channel,
that is, economic agents’ expectations. In particular, we aim to investigate whether the
expectations’ channel is able to affect the physical oil demand in the oil spot market.
Our idea is based upon the work of Sockin and Xiong (2015) arguing that economic
agents face severe informational frictions about the main mechanisms driving the oil
market. The globalization of crude oil exposes market participants to informational
frictions regarding its supply and demand. Aggregating such information from different
countries is challenging. Moreover, there may be incomplete public information on the
supply and inventory of crude oil, as it incorporates both above-ground, below-ground
and ship-board supply. Based on these facts Singleton (2014) argued that heterogenous
beliefs can lead market participants to engage in speculative trading against each other,
which, in turn, may induce commodity prices to drift away from fundamental values, and
result in price surges and plunges.
Severe informational frictions can lead to confusion among market participants about
the strength of economies. When business leaders are fearful about the future economic
outlook they can decrease their demand for oil and affect its price negatively. On the other
hand, unanticipated positive shocks to expectations due to positive policy intervention
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and strong emerging market demand can lead to a higher oil demand and, ultimately, a
higher price of oil.
Moreover, Sockin and Xiong (2015) have shown that when goods producers face un-
observable shocks to oil demand and supply standard economic intuitions may not hold.
For example, due to informational frictions, oil demand may rise with an increase in oil
prices. Confident expectations of business leaders may affect positively oil demand and,
in turn, induce an increase in the real oil price. On the other hand, business leaders may
not able to affect oil prices through the oil supply channel. To be more specifically, firms’
leaders cannot differentiate an oil price decrease caused by a positive supply shock from
an oil price decrease caused by a negative demand shock in the presence of informational
frictions. Hence, they partially attribute the supply shock to the demand shock.
All things considered, the discussion makes clear that economic agents’ expectations
are important for oil price fluctuations. Therefore, in the following subsection we present
the impulse response functions of oil prices based upon a standard Bayesian VAR (BVAR)
model. Thereafter, we investigate whether the VAR model is robust to time variation
based upon findings from our TVP-VAR model.
4.2 Fundamentals and Expectations from a BVAR Model
Using our Bayesian VAR model, Figures 3 to 5 depict the impulse responses of oil prices
to oil supply, aggregate demand and expectations shocks over the full sample and two
sub-sample periods corresponding to 1974:Q4-1998:Q4 (S1) and 1999:Q1-2016:Q1 (S2),
respectively. Our sample split relates to the pattern of oil prices showing a moderate
volatility of this series in S1 whereas, evidently, during S2 sharp changes to oil prices
have occurred (see for example, Baumeister and Peersman, 2013a). We present our
results for a ten quarter response horizon. Our responses include the posterior median
as the solid line, while the dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior
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distribution.13
We start by discussing the impulse responses functions (IRFs) of oil prices to oil mar-
ket fundamentals and business leaders’ expectation shocks (see Figure 3). The estimated
results for the full sample period are shown in the first row. As we can see, an increase
in oil production does not affect oil prices substantially since the zero axis is within the
68% posterior credible interval. On the other hand, we find that the demand shocks
have larger and more persistent long-term effects. To be more specific, aggregate demand
shocks caused by unexpected increases in global demand for all industrial commodities
lead to a persistent and significant increase in the real price of oil. The response reaches
its peak after two quarters and stabilizes soon after that. Our findings are consistent
with previous studies such as Kilian (2009) and Abhyankar et al. (2013) who also find
that supply, as compared to aggregate demand, played a less important role on average
in explaining oil price movements.
Furthermore, as we can see from the top right graph in Figure 3, a positive shock from
business leaders’ expectations about the future economic conditions causes an immediate
increase in the real price of oil. Our findings are consistent with previous literature in
other contexts showing that survey-based sentiment indicators contain additional infor-
mation on the state of economy which is not already available in other standard economic
indicators (e.g., Ludvigson, 2004; Christiansen et al., 2014).14 The second and third rows
of Figure 3 display the median impulse responses of oil prices to oil supply, aggregate
demand and expectations shocks for sub-samples S1 and S2. In general, we observe an
evolving relationship between the real price of oil, oil market fundamentals and managers’
expectations. For example, we find that the aggregate demand shocks and expectation
shocks played more important roles during the second sub-sample period as compared to
the first sub-sample period.
13Under normality, the 16th and 84th percentiles correspond to the bounds of one-standard deviation
(Primiceri, 2005).
14In addition, based on regression analysis, Deeney et al. (2015) and Han et al. (2017) found that
market-based investor sentiment and text-based investor attention proxies provide significant forecasting
power to predict oil prices, respectively.
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Given that we are interested in examining whether oil prices respond differently to
several economic agents’ expectations, now we replace the business confidence indicator in
our BVAR model with the consumer confidence indicator and composite leading indicator
over the full sample and the two sub-samples S1 and S2 (see Figures 4 and 5). As we
can observe from the first and second columns of Figures 4 and 5, the responses of oil
prices to supply and demand shocks are similar to those in Figure 3. However, changes in
consumers’ expectations with regards to future economic conditions play a less important
role as compared to business leaders’ expectations. This may be explained by the fact that
business leaders are generally better informed about the prospects of the economy than
consumers, because they focus on investment prospects and future profitability which
are affected by a large number of factors and have greater access to market information.
The top right graph of Figure 5 gives the impact of aggregate markets expectations from
our OECD composite leading indicator (CLI). Raised expectations of the state of the
economy induce a positive rise in oil prices. In addition, when we split our samples into
two sub-periods, our estimated results indicate that the relationship between the real
price of oil, oil markets’ fundamentals and economic agents’ expectations have evolved
over time (see the second and third rows of Figures 4 and 5). This motivates the use of
a TVP-VAR which firstly does not assume the impact of fundamentals and expectations
are constant over time, and secondly, does not require us to exogenously fix sub-samples.
4.2.1 Variance Decomposition Analysis
Now, we turn to the evaluation of the shocks affecting oil price fluctuations. More specif-
ically, Table 2 (Panels (i), (ii) and (iii)) reports the variance decomposition of the real
oil price for our three models including both oil market fundamentals (i.e., oil supply and
demand shocks) and expectations (i.e., business leaders, consumers, and markets). In
addition, Panel (iv) reports the results when we only include oil market fundamentals as
in Kilian (2009). Residual shocks and aggregate demand shocks are the most important
fundamentals for oil price variation. Importantly, we find that expectations of future eco-
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nomic conditions make a significant contribution in explaining the variation of the real oil
price. When we proxy expectations by confidence from business leaders in Table 2, Panel
(i), BCI shocks have the largest impact upon oil prices (around 16% after four quarters).
Moreover, we note that the contribution of BCI shocks to oil price variation is more than
twice as large as oil supply shocks. Consumers’ expectations are relatively less important
for oil price variability in Table 2, Panel (ii). Consumers’ expectations explain less than
2% of the variation of oil prices after four quarters. The results for the third proxy of
expectations (i.e., CLI shocks) are provided in Panel (iii) of Table 2. CLI shocks explain
almost around 8% of the variability in oil price changes one year after the shock occurs.
Finally, we turn to the model excluding expectations. Over longer horizon, more than
48% of variation in the real price of oil is driven by residual shocks in Panel (iv). On the
contrary, in our model including business leaders’ expectations, residual shocks account
for only 35% of the variation over the longer horizons. This indicates that expectations
can substantially, albeit not completely, fill the information gap in the oil market. To
conclude, our findings highlight the relative importance of residual, aggregate demand,
supply and business leaders’ expectations shocks in explaining oil price movements.
4.3 TVP-VAR Model with Stochastic Volatility
In this section, we focus upon the time evolution of the relationship between the real price
of oil, global oil production, aggregate real economic activity and expectations using a
TVP-VAR model with stochastic volatility. Such an approach allows us to consider
the evolving impact of oil market fundamentals, as well as expectations which may be
important when there are heightened informational frictions.
4.3.1 Response of Oil Price to Traditional Oil Market Fundamentals
We begin our time-varying analysis by highlighting that the response of oil prices to
traditional fundamental shocks is robust, irrespective of the measure of expectations.
Figures 6-8 show the contemporaneous time-varying impulse responses of oil prices to
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positive shocks in oil supply and aggregate demand. In these figures the posterior median
is the solid line and the dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior
distribution. We plot the reaction of the real price of oil for the quarter in which the shock
occurs. First, we find that positive innovations to global oil supply have a consistently
negative impact on the real price of oil (see top panels of Figures 6-8). The effect of oil
supply shocks on the real price of oil is evidently time-varying as we observe a smaller
response during the 1990’s and 2000’s as compared to the early years of our sample.
Recently with the impact of the US oil shale revolution, the negative effect of oil supply
shocks on the real price of oil has intensified again (Kilian, 2016). Our time-varying and
more nuanced results are in contrast with time-invariant studies, which have argued that
oil supply shocks have played a minor role in explaining oil price fluctuations, since only
in the 1990’s and 2000’s was supply less important (e.g., Kilian, 2009; and Abhyankar
et al., 2013).
Secondly, we find that the real price of oil has responded positively to aggregate
demand shocks over the entire sample period - see middle panels of Figures 6-8. Our
estimated results are in line with previous studies showing that an expansion in the
global economy increases demand for industrial commodities and drives up oil prices
(e.g., Kilian, 2008; Frankel, 2014). We also find that the effect of real economic activity
on oil prices is time-varying. In this regard, we confirm the findings by Kilian (2009) and
Abhyankar et al. (2013) indicating that the relationship between aggregate demand and
the real price of oil was weaker during the 1980’s and the 1990’s whereas it has intensified
in the mid-2000’s in correspondence with the unexpected increase in demand from many
emerging economies. The peak impact of demand was around the global financial crisis.
4.3.2 Response of Oil Price to Business Leaders’ Expectations
The bottom panel of Figure 6 shows that positive shocks to business leaders’ expectations
have a substantial and positive impact upon oil prices. Importantly, we note that the im-
pact of business leaders’ expectations upon oil prices is very time-dependent. In general,
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business leaders’ expectations have a large influence on physical oil demand (Angeletos
et al., 2015). This may be explained by the fact that business managers have extensive
access to information and possibly a better understanding of economic news and analyses
which also informs their investment, production and pricing decisions (e.g., Bachmann
and Sims, 2012; Delis et al., 2014; and Caglayan and Xu, 2016).
However, in the presence of informational frictions, firms’ managers are not able to
influence the real oil price through the oil supply channel. In particular, they are not
able to differentiate between oil demand and supply shocks (Sockin and Xiong, 2015).
For example, in the case of an oil supply shock, they partially attribute such a shock to
demand. In such a situation, the information content of business leaders is relatively low
and their influence on the oil price is limited.
The time-varying response of oil prices to business leaders’ expectations can be better
understood focusing upon the main oil episodes during the period 1985-2016. From the
top panel of Figure 6, we note that since the mid-1980’s until the beginning of the 1990’s
oil supply shocks have played an important role in oil price changes. In this regard,
the first significant episode of oil price increase in our sample is at the beginning of
the 1990’s corresponding to the Iraq-Kuwait war. As we have explained above, business
leaders’ expectations have a negligible influence on the oil price through the oil supply
channel. Therefore, from the bottom panel of Figure 6 we observe that during this period
the oil price response to a BCI shock is not substantial.
From the middle panel of Figure 6, we note that in the period 2002-2008 an important
source of oil price changes has been oil demand. In particular, the increase in the oil price
during this period coincided with the sustained global oil demand pressure mainly from
emerging countries. Global growth in oil demand during this period was exceptional.15
As we have explained above, business leaders’ expectations strongly affect oil demand.
Therefore, from the bottom panel of Figure 6, we note that the response of the oil price
to BCI shocks is important over this period.
15See, for example, Hamilton (2009).
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Cheng and Xiong (2014) observed that, in the period 2009-2014 heterogenous expec-
tations among business leaders led these agents to engage in speculative trading against
each other, which, in turn, induced the oil price to drift away from its fundamental value.
In this regard, Lorusso and Pieroni (2018) have argued that the increase in the oil price
between 2009-2014 was mainly associated with a strong precautionary demand for oil.
In particular, the social and political instability in the Middle East and North African
regions raised worries of supply disruptions and possible oil shortage. Therefore, from
the bottom panel of Figure 6, we note that in the period following the financial crisis BCI
shocks largely affect oil price movements.
Finally, from 2014 onwards the dramatic fall in the oil price has been related to the
increase in oil production, namely, the US tight oil (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016). In
particular, the US re-emerged as a main oil producer extracting oil through the hydraulic
fracturing, the so-called shale oil revolution. As we can see from the bottom panel of
Figure 6, during this period BCI shocks have a less important impact on the oil price.
4.3.3 Response of Oil Price to Consumers’ Expectations and Markets’ Ex-
pectations
Our estimated results indicate a weak link between consumers’ confidence and oil prices.
The negative sign of the relationship between consumer expectations and oil prices is a
puzzle. However, from the bottom panel of Figure 7 we observe that, since the beginning
of the financial crisis, although there is some evidence of time variation in the response
of the real price of oil, the posterior intervals are so wide to leave open the possibility
that the consumers’ confidence shocks is not important.
From the bottom panel of Figure 8, we note that the response of the oil price to
increases in market expectations is initially negative whereas, from 2000’s onwards it
becomes positive. However, the posterior intervals are very large suggesting the responses
remained unchanged. This result may be explained by the nature of composite leading
indicators combining the expectations of business leaders and consumers. As we have
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seen in Figures 6 and 7, business leaders and consumers shocks have opposite effects
on oil prices. Therefore, aggregate expectations have an ambiguous effect on the real
oil price. In conclusion, our empirical findings highlight the importance for allowing for
heterogeneous expectations across economic agents (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016). In
this regard, our results are consistent with the arguments from Morris and Shin (2002)
and Sockin and Xiong (2015).
4.4 Robustness Checks
We now report some robustness checks for our TVP-VAR model, and the results are
in Appendix B. We begin our robustness analysis by considering the potential role of
refineries’ expectations in our model. In particular, oil refineries could have their own
expectations about the future, which could be different in principle from business leaders
and consumers. Unlike for businesses’, consumers’ or markets’ expectations, there are
not specific surveys that have been produced to capture refiners’ confidence. Given crude
oil is storable, the price of oil and refined oil products are highly correlated. Oil refineries
have the incentive to adjust their demand and holding of inventories to minimize their
input costs. For example, if refineries are expecting an increased uncertainty about the
oil market demand or supply conditions they can increase their demand for oil with the
intention to store for future use. As a consequence, these activities can raise the futures
price of oil, which in turn would drive up the spot price as less of the oil is made available
for current consumption (e.g., Kilian and Murphy, 2014). On the other hand, refineries
may reduce their inventories by predicting a global recession, and/or anticipate higher
level of future oil production.
In order to proxy the impact of refineries’ expectations on oil prices, we collected
data for OECD inventories from the International Energy Agency (IEA) for the period
of 1974:Q4 to 2016:Q1. We obtained the series of refineries’ inventories as the difference
of total crude oil stocks and crude oil stocks held by governments.16 According to Knit-
16Note that IEA only provide total crude oil stocks at annual frequency for the period 1974 to 1983.
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tel and Pindyck (2016) such series can be interpreted as a forward-looking time series
because fluctuations in inventories can be considered as a proxy of variations in agents’
expectations. 17 Therefore, we re-estimated our TVP-VAR model with refineries’ expec-
tations instead of our other measures of expectations. As we can observe from Figure B1,
an increase in refineries’ expectations does not substantially affect the real oil price since
the zero axis is within the error bands. Accordingly, our findings suggest that refiners’
expectations have a negligible effect on oil prices.
As a second robustness check, we have investigated the robustness of our results to
potential omitted variable bias by considering our three expectations measures simultane-
ously. Firstly, we used the principal component analysis to extract a common factor from
BCI, CCI and CLI. Then, we re-estimated the TVP-VAR model replacing the original
expectations indexes with the new created series. Figure B2 shows the IRFs of the oil
price in the presence of shocks to aggregate expectations of business leaders, consumers
and markets. We note that the response is not important implying that changes in ag-
gregate expectations do not affect the real oil price. We also included all expectations
measures and other fundamentals in a single TVP-VAR model - see Figure B3. However,
consistent with Kilian (2013) the results were difficult to interpret and may have been
susceptible to problems with over-fitting. As we can notice from the estimated results,
the response of the real price of oil is weak not only in the case of expectations’ shocks
but also for oil market fundamentals shocks.18
Our third robustness check focuses on the series of the oil price. In particular, many
previous studies analysing the determinants of oil price fluctuations have considered the
impact of US refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil (see, for example, Barsky and
We disaggregated these data into quarterly frequency using the Denton (1971) approach. Moreover,
for the same period, data for crude oil stocks held by government are missing. In order to obtain the
series of refineries inventories we used the growth rates of quarterly total crude oil stocks. Following this
procedure, we implicitly assumed that the share of government stocks for to period 1974:Q3-1983:Q4 has
been stable and equal to that of 1984:Q1. Our assumption is based on the fact that this share has been
almost constant (around 30%) for the period 1984-1987.
17We would like to thank one of the anonymous referees suggesting to consider the role of inventories.
18As suggested by a helpful Reviewer we were not able to entirely rule out omitted variable bias from
our results, although this is ameliorated by the degree of correlation between the expectation variables
and also small scale VARs are widely used to avoid over-fitting in this literature.
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Kilian, 2004; Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2012). Therefore, we re-estimated our
models by replacing the series of the Europe Brent spot price with this series. Table B1
suggests that the responses of oil prices to oil supply, aggregate demand and expectations
shocks are in line with those reported in Figures 6-8.
The fourth robustness check provides evidence that our assumptions about the iden-
tification order adopted in our impulse response analysis do not influence the main em-
pirical findings. Table B2 shows that the directions of the responses to the structural
shocks are qualitatively similar when we placed the economic agents’ expectations first
in equation (2). Finally, we replace the economic agents’ expectations emanated from
all OECD countries to the US market only. The estimated impulse response functions
of oil prices to oil market fundamentals and expectations shocks are shown in Table B3.
Again, this robustness check does not qualitatively change our main findings.
5 Conclusion
Modelling oil price movements is important to many decision makers in macroeconomic
policy, capital investment/production decisions, consumption, risk and portfolio man-
agement. The oil price is considered as an important barometer for the global economy
(Sockin and Xiong, 2015; Ravazzolo and Rothman, 2016).
Our paper extends the topical literature on identifying the determinants of oil prices,
by emphasising the role of economic agents’ expectations. Our investigation focuses upon
expectations from three sources: business leaders, consumers and markets. Oil price may
not fully reflect fundamentals since agents can have severe informational frictions. In
this context expectations impact oil prices, although the source of these expectations
matters. Our empirical strategy is based on a TVP-VAR model with stochastic volatility
to flexibly delineate the impact of fundamentals and economic agents’ expectations.
Our estimated results show that both traditional fundamentals and heterogeneous
economic agents’ affect oil prices over time. We find that the source of economic expecta-
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tions matters. In particular, innovations to business leaders’ expectations greatly affect
oil price movements. We provide evidence that increases in business leaders’ expectations
have a large and positive impact upon the real price of oil. This effect increases during
periods of high oil demand. Our findings also show that consumers’ expectations only
explain a small proportion of overall oil price variability.
In sum, our empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that there is non-constant
relationship between traditional oil market fundamentals and heterogenous economic
agents’ expectations. Therefore, regulators should consider how their policies (e.g., cap-
ital and asset allocation, taxes, and environmental policies) shall be perceived by firms’
mangers and households. Moreover, informational frictions and expectations may be im-
portant for other commodity prices, such as metals and agricultural price. We shall leave
these topics for future work.
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Figure 1: Time Series Proxies of Economic Agents’ Expectations
Notes: This figure contains time series data based upon business leaders’ expectations as proxied by
OECD Business Confidence Index (BCI). Also included are consumers’ expectations as proxied by Con-
sumer Confidence Index (CCI). Finally, we proxy market analysts’ expectations using Composite Leading
Indicators (CLI).
Source: OECD Monthly Main Economic Indicators Database.
Figure 2: Europe Brent Spot Crude Price FOB
Notes: Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (US dollars per barrel) and major oil price episodes.
Source: Datastream database.
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Figure 3: BVAR Impulse Responses of Real Price of Oil under Business Leaders’
Expectations
Notes: In each graph solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate the 16th
and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three different shocks to oil prices: oil supply, aggregate
demand and Business Confidence Indicator (BCI). The first row reports the IRFs for the full sample
period (1974:Q4-2016:Q1) whereas, the second and third rows report the IRFs for two sub-samples
1974:Q4-1998:Q4 (S1) and 1999:Q1-2016:Q1 (S2), respectively.
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Figure 4: BVAR Impulse Responses of the Real Price of Oil under Consumers’
Expectations
Notes: In each graph solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate the 16th
and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three different shocks to oil prices: oil supply, aggregate
demand and Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI). The first row reports the IRFs for the full sample
period (1974:Q4-2016:Q1) whereas, the second and third rows report the IRFs for two sub-samples
1974:Q4-1998:Q4 (S1) and 1999:Q1-2016:Q1 (S2), respectively.
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Figure 5: BVAR Impulse Responses of the Real Price of Oil under Markets’
Expectations
Notes: In each graph solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate the 16th
and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three different shocks to oil prices: oil supply, aggregate
demand and Composite Leading Indicator (CLI). The first row reports the IRFs for the full sample
period (1974:Q4-2016:Q1) whereas, the second and third rows report the IRFs for two sub-samples
1974:Q4-1998:Q4 (S1) and 1999:Q1-2016:Q1 (S2), respectively.
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Figure 6: TVP-VAR Impulse Responses of Real Price of Oil under Business Leaders’
Expectations
Notes: Each panel measures how a unit impulse of several shocks impacts the oil price over the full
sample period. In each panel solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate
the 16th and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three different shocks to oil prices: oil supply,
aggregate demand and Business Confidence Indicator (BCI). The estimates are based on the TVP-VAR
model with Stochastic Volatility.
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Figure 7: TVP-VAR Impulse Responses of Real Price of Oil under Consumers’
Expectations
Notes: Each panel measures how a unit impulse of several shocks impacts the oil price over the full
sample period. In each panel solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate
the 16th and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three different shocks to oil prices: oil supply,
aggregate demand and Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI). The estimates are based on the TVP-VAR
model with Stochastic Volatility.
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Figure 8: TVP-VAR Impulse Responses of Real Price of Oil under Markets’
Expectations
Notes: Each panel measures how a unit impulse of several shocks impacts the oil price over the full
sample period. In each panel solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate
the 16th and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three different shocks to oil prices: oil supply,
aggregate demand and Composite Leading Indicator (CLI). The estimates are based on the TVP-VAR
model with Stochastic Volatility.
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Table 1: Data Sources and Definitions
Variable Data Series Definition Sources of Data
Percentage
change in
global oil pro-
duction
Global Oil Pro-
duction
World crude oil production in
millions per barrels pumped
per day (averaged by quarter).
Energy Informa-
tion Administra-
tion, Monthly En-
ergy Review
Global real eco-
nomic activity
Single-voyage
freight rates
See Kilian (2009) for detailed
information on how to con-
struct this series.
Lutz Kilians
homepage:
http://www-
personal.umich.edu/ lk-
il-
ian/reaupdate.txt.
Economic
Agents’ Expec-
tations
Business Confi-
dence Indicator
(BCI)
BCI is a composite indicator
that summarizes managers’
assessments and expectations
of the general economic situa-
tion.
OECD Monthly
Main Eco-
nomic Indicators
database.
Consumer Confi-
dence Indicator
(CCI)
CCI includes indicators on
consumer confidence, ex-
pected economic situation
and price expectations.
Composite Lead-
ing Indicator
(CLI)
CLI is an aggregate time se-
ries displaying a reasonably
consistent leading relationship
with the reference series (e.g.,
industrial production up to
March 2012 and GDP after-
wards) for the macroeconomic
cycle in a country. CLI is
designed to provide early sig-
nals of turning points between
expansions and slowdowns of
economic activity.
Real oil Price Europe Brent
spot price FOB
The original series is aggre-
gated in quarterly terms and
deflated using the US CPI.
DataStream
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Table 2: Variance Decomposition of the Real Price of Oil
Panel (i): Model Including Business Leaders’ Expectations
Horizon Supply Shock Demand Shock BCI Shock Residual Shock
1 3.72% 13.05% 7.15% 76.09%
4 6.62% 23.29% 16.15% 53.94%
12 5.07% 42.62% 11.18% 41.12%
∞ 4.24% 51.85% 9.36% 34.55%
Panel (ii): Model Including Consumers’ Expectations
Horizon Supply Shock Demand Shock CCI Shock Residual Shock
1 5.08% 11.67% 1.13% 82.11%
4 9.36% 24.76% 1.88% 63.99%
12 7.82% 41.84% 3.18% 47.17%
∞ 7.24% 46.92% 3.54% 42.30%
Panel (iii): Model Including Markets’ Expectations
Horizon Supply Shock Demand Shock CLI Shock Residual Shock
1 4.58% 11.81% 0.01% 83.61%
4 9.20% 23.77% 7.70% 59.32%
12 8.16% 40.17% 6.43% 45.23%
∞ 7.20% 48.21% 5.80% 38.79%
Panel (iv): Model without Expectations
Horizon Supply Shock Demand Shock Residual Shock
1 2.72% 12.91% 84.38%
4 6.37% 21.36% 72.27%
12 4.77% 40.30% 54.93%
∞ 4.13% 48.23% 47.64%
Notes: The variance decomposition of the real oil price is based on the estimates of the BVAR
model for the full sample. The table presents the percentage contribution of each shock to the
overall variability of the real oil price for one quarter, four quarters, twelve quarters and infinity.
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Appendix A: Constant BVAR and TVP-BVAR Models
This appendix shows the full derivation of both constant parameter Bayesian VAR and
time-varying parameter Bayesian VAR with stochastic volatility.
In the constant parameter Bayesian VAR we employ the reduced-form representation
of equation (1) in the main text by multiplying both sides by A−10 , resulting in:
Yt = Σ
p
i=1BiYt−1 + A
−1
0 ut (A1)
where Bi = A
−1
0 Γi for i = 1, ..., p and ut is i.i.d. N(0,Σ). We can stack all the VAR
coefficients (Bi) into a K
2p × 1 vector to form B and define Xt = Ik ⊗ (Y ′t−1, ..., Y ′t−p),
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. We rewrite equation (A1) as:
Yt = XtB + A
−1
0 ut (A2)
Note that the reduced-form residuals εt = A
−1
0 ut are correlated between each equation.
In order to orthogonalize the shocks, we impose a recursive structure on the contempo-
raneous terms and assuming that A−10 is lower-triangular:
A−10 =

1 0 . . . 0
a21
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
ak1 . . . ak1,k−1 1

(A3)
The ordering of the variables is as follows: Yt = [∆prodt, reat,∆expt, rpot]. Our restric-
tions on A−10 are based on the following assumptions and economic intuitions. Our first
assumption is that, instantaneously, global oil supply does not respond to short-run de-
mand shocks in the crude oil market. This is plausible since, in the short-run, changes
in oil production are costly, largely irreversible and can be delayed. Therefore, oil pro-
ducers adopt a wait and see approach, and base their production plans on expectations
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of medium-term demand (see e.g., Hamilton, 2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2012). The sec-
ond assumption we make is that increases in the real price of oil, say driven by agents’
expectations or oil-market specific demand, do not immediately impact global economic
activity. This assumption relies on the absence of evidence of instantaneous feedback
from changes in the real oil price and agents’ expectations to the dry cargo ocean freight
rates: the latter is Lutz Kilian’s measure of global real activity (see for example, Kilian
and Murphy, 2014; Gao et al., 2017). Our third assumption is that changes to eco-
nomic expectations respond to supply and demand shocks without a delay. In particular,
Bernanke et al. (2005), and Stock and Watson (2005) have classified agents’ expectations
as a fast-moving variable, responding contemporaneously to slow-moving variables, such
as oil production and global real economic activity. Finally, shocks to the real oil price
that are not explained by oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks or expectations’
shocks by construction reflect the residual shocks not otherwise accounted for.
As described in the main text the constant parameter VAR model is estimated with
Bayesian techniques. We adopt the independent Normal-Wishart prior:
B ∼ N(B, VB)
Σ−1 ∼ W (S−1, v)
where B = 0, VB = 10I4, S = I4, and v = 5 are as in Koop and Korobilis (2010). The
conditional posterior distributions p(B | Y,Σ−1) and p(Σ−1 | Y,B) are computed by the
MCMC method. Following Primiceri (2005), we use a training sample prior to obtain the
initial Σ−1.
In the time-varying parameter Bayesian VAR with stochastic volatility equation (A2)
becomes:
Yt = XtBt + A
−1
t ut (A4)
where Bt and A
−1
t are time-varying and ut is i.i.d. N(0,Σt). We follow Primiceri (2005)
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and assume that at is the vector of non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix At
(stacked by rows) and σt is the vector of the diagonal elements of Σt. The parameters in
(A4) follow a driftless random walk process, thus allowing both temporary and permanent
shift in the parameters. Assuming that ht = log σt, we can write:
Bt = Bt−1 + vt (A5)
at = at−1 + ζt (A6)
ht = ht−1 + ηt (A7)
All the innovations in the model are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with the
following assumptions on the variance-covariance matrix (V ):

ut
vt
ζt
ηt

∼ N

0,

I 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 W


, t = 1, ..., T
where I is an n-dimensional identity matrix, Q, S and W are positive definite matrices.
The shocks to the innovations of the time-varying parameters are assumed uncorrelated
among the parameters Bt, at and ht. We further assume for simplicity that Q, S and W
are all diagonal matrices. Following Primiceri (2005), we adopt the additional assump-
tion of S being block diagonal, with blocks corresponding to parameters belonging to
separate equations. The coefficients of the contemporaneous relations among variables
are assumed to evolve independently in each equation. Our dynamic specification permits
the parameters to vary and the shock log variance follows a random walk process to cap-
ture possible gradual or sudden structural changes, as discussed by Primiceri (2005). As
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before, we employ a training sample prior and the prior distributions are set as follows:
B0 ∼ N(BOLS, 4 · V (BOLS))
a0 ∼ N(aOLS, 4 · V (aOLS))
h0 ∼ N(hOLS, 4 · Ik)
where BOLS, AOLS, and hOLS denote the OLS point estimates and V (·) denotes the
variance. We also need to set the hyper-parameters Q, S, and W and we postulate the
following inverse-Wishart prior distributions:
Q ∼ IW (k2Q · 40 · V (BOLS), 40)
W ∼ IW (k2S, 2)
S1 ∼ IW (k2T · 2 · V (A2,OLS), 2)
S2 ∼ IW (k2T · 3 · V (A3,OLS), 3)
S3 ∼ IW (k2T · 4 · V (A4,OLS), 4)
where kB = 0.01, kα = 0.1, and kh = 1. Moreover, S1, S2, and S3 denote the three
blocks of S, respectively. A2,OLS, A3,OLS and A4,OLS are the three corresponding blocks
of AOLS.
19.
We follow the MCMC procedures proposed by Primiceri (2005) and the estimation
process are as follows:
1. Initialize At, Σt, ht and V ;
2. Conditional on Yt, Bt, Σt and V , draw VAR coefficients Bt;
3. Conditional on Yt, Bt, Σt and V , draw contemporaneous coefficients At;
4. Conditional on Yt, At, Bt, ht and V , draw covariance matrix parameters for residuals
Σt;
19S1 includes information on a21; S2 contains information on a21, a31, and a32; S3 embraces information
on a21, a31, a32, a41, a42 and a43
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5. Conditional on Yt, At, Σt and V , draw volatility states ht;
6. Draw hyperparameters V , which is obtained by drawing ΣB, Σa, and Σh. The
hyperparameters ΣB, Σa, and Σh are square blocks, and each block has an invers-
Wishart distribution which is independent from other blocks;
7. Return to #2.
The details of this algorithm are shown in the Appendix of Primiceri (2005).
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Appendix B: Robustness Checks
Figure B1: TVP-VAR Impulse Responses of Real Price of Oil under Refineries’
Expectations
Notes: Each panel measures how a unit impulse of several shocks impacts the oil price over the full
sample period. In each panel solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate
the 16th and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three different shocks to oil prices: oil supply,
aggregate demand and refineries’ expectations. The estimates are based on the TVP-VAR model with
Stochastic Volatility.
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Figure B2: TVP-VAR Impulse Responses of Real Price of Oil under Aggregate
Expectations
Notes: Each panel measures how a unit impulse of several shocks impacts the oil price over the full
sample period. In each panel solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate
the 16th and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three different shocks to oil prices: oil supply,
aggregate demand and aggregate expectations. The estimates are based on the TVP-VAR model with
Stochastic Volatility.
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Figure B3: Impulse Responses of Real Oil Price Obtained from Six Variable TVP-VAR
Notes: In each graph solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate the 16th and
84th percentiles error bands. We consider five different shocks to oil prices: oil supply, aggregate demand,
Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI), Composite Leading Indicator (CLI) and Business Confidence
Indicator (BCI). The estimates are based on the TVP-VAR model with Stochastic Volatility.
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